Analyzing macro-political processes is complicated by four interrelated problems: model scale, endogeneity, persistence, and specification uncertainty. These problems are endemic in the study of political economy, public opinion, international relations, and other kinds of macro-political research. We show how a Bayesian structural time series approach addresses them. Our illustration is a structurally identified, nine equation model of the U.S. politicaleconomic system. It combines key features of Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson's model of the American macropolity (2002) with those of a leading macroeconomic model of U.S. Zha 1998 and Leeper, Sims, and Zha 1996) . This structural model, with a loose informed prior, yields the best performance in terms of model fit and new insights into the dynamics of the American political economy. The model 1) captures the conventional wisdom about the countercyclical nature of monetary policy (Williams 1990) 2) reveals informational sources of approval dynamics: innovations in information variables affect consumer sentiment and approval and the impacts on consumer sentiment feed-forward into subsequent approval changes, 3) finds that the real economy does not have any major impacts on key macropolity variables and 4) concludes that macropartisanship does not depend on the evolution of the real economy in the short or medium term and only very weakly on informational variables in the long term.
Introduction
Many political scientists are interested in modeling macro-political systems. Aggregate public opinion research does this focusing on a small number of opinion variables and some economic variables. Political economists do this using data on policy and economic outcomes of interest to voters, outcomes that are functions of underlying political variables. International relations scholars typically model the behavior of groups of belligerents over time to analyze the evolution of cooperation and conflict.
Modeling macro-political dynamics in these varied research areas is complex for four reasons.
The first is the problem of scale. Macro-political systems are composed of many variables and of multiple causal relationships. For instance, in American political economy one must take into account relationships between public opinion variables and partisanship, and between these variables and output, employment, and prices. Similarly, students of international relations must account for the behavioral relationships of all important belligerent groups within and between countries.
A second problem is endogeneity. While some variables in macro-political processes clearly are exogenous, we believe that others are both a cause and a consequence of each other. For example, our understanding of democracy implies that there is some popular accountability for economic policy and thus endogeneity between popular evaluations of the economy and macroeconomic outcomes (or policies).
Persistence is a third problem. Some variables are driven by short-term forces that can be exogenous to the macro-political process under study. There also are deeper, medium and longterm forces that make trends in variables persist and even create long-term, common trends among variables (e.g., cointegration).
Finally, specification uncertainty is a problem. We have no equivalent of macroeconomic General Equilibrium Theory that can help us specify functional forms. The problems of scale, endogeneity, and persistence mean that models have many coefficients and that their dynamic implications (impulse responses) and forecasts have wide error bands (i.e., are quite imprecise). Because of these problems our models also tend to "overfit" our data.
None of the approaches commonly used to model dynamic processes in political science together addresses all four problems. The most common macro-models are single equation autoregressive distributed lag models (ADL) and pooled time series cross-sectional (TSCS) regressions.
These single equation models expressly omit multiple relationships among endogenous variables.
Common practice is to make each relationship the subject of a different article, to treat a variable as dependent in one article and independent in another.
1 Users of ADL and TSCS models usually acknowledge endogeneity problems, but rarely perform exogeneity tests. Rather ad hoc solutions to this problem are used like omitting contemporaneous relationships between variables, temporally aggregating data, and employing contrived variables for simultaneity. Some researchers use instrumental variable estimators for this purpose but, rarely evaluate the adequacy of their instruments.
Also, treatments of persistence often are based on knife-edged pretests for unit roots. variables (or equations) where all variables are endogenous. The problem is that most macroeconomists now argue there are many more key relationships in markets. Models with more variables are needed to capture macroeconomic dynamics (e.g., Leeper, Sims and Zha 1996) . We know of no work in international political economy with a reduced form model on this scale, for instance, a model that includes 3-4 equations for each of three or four trading partners. 3 Students of international conflict have built reduced form models with 24-28 equations, but restrict their investigations to simple (Granger) causality testing. They do not use their models to study conflict dynamics or to produce forecasts because without some restrictions on the model the specification uncertainty renders the dynamic responses quite imprecise. 4 Finally, users of simulation methods such as Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002, Chap- ter 10) and Alesina, Londregan and Rosenthal (1993) address the scale and persistence issues.
But they expressly eschew endogeneity, making restrictions that treat macro-political processes as (quasi-)recursive. These researchers also do not produce meaningful measures of precision for their dynamic analyses. of a leading neo-Keynesian U.S. macroeconomic model (Leeper, Sims and Zha 1996, Sims and Zha 1998 ). This structural model, with an informed prior, yields the best performance in terms of a mean squared error loss criterion and new insights into the dynamics of the American political economy. The model 1) captures the conventional wisdom about the countercyclical nature of monetary policy (Williams 1990 ) 2) reveals informational sources of approval dynamics: innovations in information variables affect consumer sentiment and approval and the impacts on consumer sentiment feed-forward into subsequent approval changes, 3) finds that the real economy does not have any major impacts on key macropolity variables and 4) concludes that macropartisanship does not depend on the evolution of the real economy in the short or medium term and only very weakly on informational variables in the long term. In the spirit of the Bayesian approach (Gill 2002 (Gill , 2004 Jackman 2004, in progress) , these results are insensitive to alternative specifications of prior beliefs, including beliefs motivated by the late-1990s macropartisanship debate. Directions for extending the Bayesian structural time series approach to macro-political analysis and to linking it with formal theory are discussed briefly in the conclusion. 5 Erikson et al. refer to endogeneity as a "nuisance" and a "nightmare" (2002, 386) . Their analysis imposes strong restrictions-some contemporaneous relationships are ignored and a recursive structure-on the interrelationships between variables and on their lag specifications. This is despite their argument that feedback is a defining feature of the macro-political economy. Erikson et al. also provide no error bands for their impulse responses.
Bayesian Time Series Models and the Study of Macro-Political Dynamics
Following the publication of Sims's (1980) seminal article on macroeconomic modeling, political scientists began exploring the usefulness of reduced form methods (Freeman, Williams and Lin 1989 , Williams 1990 , Brandt and Williams 2007 . This approach holds that macro theory is not strong enough to specify the functional forms of equations. Macro theory is at best a set of loose causal claims translating into a weak set of model restrictions. Thus progress in macro theory results from analyzing reduced forms and subjecting these forms to (orthogonalized) shocks in the respective variables (e.g., innovation accounting or impulse responses). If there are any structural insights they are best represented as contemporaneous relationships between our variables, but then only as zero restrictions (Bernanke 1986 ). In the last twenty years, this approach has been applied to a wide range of topics in political science such as agenda setting, public opinion, political economy and international conflict.
A parallel development in political science is the use of the Bayesian methods. This approach rests on two main premises: 1) political phenomena are inherently uncertain and changing and 2) available prior information should be used in model specification (Gill 2004, 324) . Bayesianism stresses systematically incorporating previous knowledge into the modeling process, being explicit about how prior beliefs influence specification and results, making rigorous probability statements about quantities of interest, and gauging sensitivity of the results to a model's assumptions (ibid.
333-334).
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Here we bring these two developments together. We show how 1) the Bayesian approach makes time series analysis both more systematic and informative, and 2) how prior information about dynamics and contemporaneous relationships can be utilized.
6 Gill (2004, 333-334) lists seven features of the Bayesian approach. Only four of these are mentioned in the text. Others include updating tomorrow's priors on the basis of today's posteriors, treating missing values in the same way as other elements of models like parameters, and recognizing that population quantities change over time. Jackman (2004) explains how frequentist and Bayesian approaches differ but also how, under certain conditions, their inferences can "coincide" (e.g., when the prior is uniform, the posterior density can have the same shape as the likelihood). See also Gill 2004, 327-328. 
Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregessions
We first present a multiple equation model for the relationships among a set of endogenous variables. Our goal in employing such a system of equations is to isolate the behavioral interpretations of the equations for each variable by imposing structure via restrictions on the system of equations.
7
The contemporaneous structure of the system is important for two reasons. First, it identifies (in a theoretical and statistical sense) these possible contemporaneous relationships among the variables in the model. Second, restrictions on the structural relationships imply short and long term relationships among the variables.
The basic model for macro-political data has one equation for each of the endogenous variables in the system. Each of the endogenous variables is a function of the contemporaneous (time "0") and p past (lagged) values of all of the endogenous variables in the system. This produces a dynamic simultaneous equation model that can be written in matrix notation as
with each vector's and matrix's dimensions noted below the matrix. This is an m-dimensional vector autoregression (VAR) for a sample size of T , with y t a vector of observations for m variables at time t, A the coefficient matrix for the th lag, = 1, . . . , p, p the maximum number of lags This model is estimated via multivariate regression methods Zha 1998, Waggoner and Zha 2003a) . The Bayesian version of this model or B-SVAR incorporates informed beliefs about the dynamics of the variables. These beliefs are represented in a prior distribution for the parameters. Sims and Zha (1998) suggest that the prior for A is conditioned on that for A 0 . 9 To describe the prior, we place the corresponding elements of A 0 and the A into vectors. For a given A 0 , contemporaneous coefficient matrix, let a 0 be a vector that is the columns of A 0 stacked in column-major order for each equation. For the A parameters that describe the lag dynamics, let A + be an (m 2 p + 1) × m matrix that stacks the lag coefficients and then the constant (rows) for each equation (columns). Finally, let a + be a vector that stacks the columns of A + in column major order (so the first equation's coefficient, then the second equation's, etc.). The prior over a 0 and
where the tilde denotes the mean parameters in the prior density for a + , φ(·, ·) is a multivariate normal with meanã + and covariance Ψ.
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Sims and Zha's (1998) prior addresses the main problems of macro modeling. For example, the prior addresses the scale problem by putting lower probability on the coefficients of the lagged effects, thus shrinking these parameters toward zero. But rather than imposing (possibly incorrect) exact restrictions on these coefficients such as zeroing out lags or deleting variables altogether, the prior imposes a set of inexact restrictions on the lag coefficients. These inexact restrictions are prior beliefs that many of the coefficients in the model-especially those for the higher order lags-have a prior mean of zero. The prior is then correlated across equations in a way that depends on the contemporaneous relationships between variables (the covariance of reduced form disturbances via the A 0 matrix of the SVAR). This allows beliefs about the identification of systems such as the the macro-political economy to be included a priori and thus improve inferences and forecasting.
Finally, the prior is centered on a random walk model: it is based on the belief that most time series are best explained by their most recent values.
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The Sims-Zha prior parameterizes the beliefs about the conditional mean of the coefficients of the lagged effects in a + given a 0 in Equation (2). Once more, the prior mean is assumed to be that the best predictor of a series tomorrow is its value today. The conditional prior covariance of the parameters, V (a + |a 0 ) = Ψ is more complicated. It is specified to reflect the following beliefs about the series:
1. The standard deviations around the first lag coefficients are proportional to those for the coefficients of all other lags.
2. The weight of each variable's own lags in explaining its variance is the same as the weights on other variables' lags in an equation.
3. The standard deviation of the coefficients of longer lags are proportionately smaller than 10 When the prior in equation (2) has a symmetric structure (i.e., it differs by only a scale factor across the equations) the posterior conditional on A 0 is multivariate normal. See Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) , Sims and Zha (1999) , and . 11 This does not mean we are assuming the data follow a random walk. Instead it serves as a benchmark for the prior. If it is inconsistent with the data, the data will produce a posterior that does not reflect this belief.
those of the coefficients of earlier lags. Lag coefficients shrink to zero over time and have smaller variance at higher lags.
4. The standard deviation of the intercept is proportionate to the standard deviation of the residuals for the equation.
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A series of hyperparameters are used to scale the standard deviation of the model coefficients to reflect these beliefs. Table 1 summarizes the hyperparameters in the Sims-Zha prior. The key feature of this specification is that the interdependence of beliefs is reflected in the conditioning of the prior on the structural contemporaneous relationships, A 0 . Beliefs about the parameters are correlated in the same patterns as the reduced form contemporaneous residuals. If for theoretical reasons we expect large correlations in the reduced form innovations of two variables, the corresponding regressors are similarly correlated to reflect this belief and to ensure that the series move in a way that is consistent with their unconditional correlations.
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[ The posterior density for the model parameters is then formed by combining the likelihood for equation (1) and the prior:
Estimation and sampling from the model's posterior is via a Gibbs sampler. The main complication in the Gibbs sampler is the sampling from the over-identified cases of the contemporaneous A 0 coefficients. Waggoner and Zha (2003a) show how to properly draw from the posterior of A 0
given the identification restrictions that may be imposed on the A 0 coefficients. We have implemented this Gibbs sampler for the full set of posterior coefficients. We employ it here to estimate 12 The scale of these standard deviations is determined by a series of univariate AR(p) regressions for each endogenous variable. The hyperparameters then scale the standard deviations from the AR(p) regressions for the prior.
13 Sims and Zha (1998, 955) write "Thus if our prior on [the matrix of structural coefficients for contemporaneous relationships among the variables] puts high probability on large coefficients on some particular variable j in equation i, then the prior probability on large coefficients on the corresponding variable j at the first lag is high as well." our B-SVAR model of the American political economy. 14 A key feature of the B-SVAR model is that its contemporaneous restrictions affect the dynamic parameters. This can be seen by examining the reduced form of the structural model in equation
(1). The reduced form representation of the B-SVAR is written in terms of the contemporaneous values of the (endogenous) variables and their (weakly exogenous or predetermined) past values,
This is an m-dimensional multivariate time series model for each observation in the sample, with y t an 1 × m vector of observations at time t, B the m × m coefficient matrix for the th lag, and p the maximum number of lags. In this formulation, all of the contemporaneous effects (which are in the A 0 matrix of the SVAR) are included in the covariance of the reduced form residuals, u t .
The reduced form in Equation (4) 
where the last term in equation (5) indicates how linear combinations of structural residuals are embedded in the reduced form residuals. As equation (5) shows, restricting elements of A 0 to be zero restricts the linear combinations that describe the reduced form dynamics of the system of equations via the resulting restrictions on B and u t .
These restrictions also affect the correlations among the reduced form residuals. This is because zero restrictions in A 0 affect the interpretation and computation of the variances of the reduced form residuals:
In a standard reduced form analysis, A −1 0 is specified as a just-identified triangular matrix (via a Cholesky decomposition of Σ) so there is a recursive, contemporaneous causal chain among the equations. A maximum likelihood method can be used to estimate the reduced form parameters of the model and from these parameters the elements of the associated A 0 can be ascertained.
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For SVARs, the A 0 is typically non-recursive and over-identified. Frequentist estimation uses a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the non-recursive contemporaneous relationships in the parameters of A 0 (Blanchard and Quah 1989 , Bernanke 1986 , Sims 1986b ). This procedure uses the reduced form residual covariance Σ in equation (6) 0 is a Cholesky decomposition of Σ implies a recursive or Wold causal chain between the disturbances. This Cholesky decomposition exists because the reduced form error covariance matrix Σ is positive definite. For a discussion and application of the concept of a Wold causal chain in political science see Freeman, Williams and Lin (1989) or Brandt and Williams (2007) . 16 To estimate non-recursive A 0 's, it is necessary to satisfy both an order and a rank condition as detailed in Hamilton (1994 Hamilton ( , 1994 ). (Note that as regards Hamilton's formulation, in our case his D matrix is an identity matrix.) In our illustration below, the numerical optimization of the posterior peak requires that the rank condition is satisfied.
Since A 0 and B describe the reduced form dynamics of the system the B-SVAR restrictions also affect the estimates of the impulse responses which are the moving average representation of the impact of shocks to the model. These responses, C t+s describe how the system reacts in period t + s to a change in the reduced form residual u s at time s > t. These impulse responses are computed recursively from the reduced form coefficients and A 0 :
with C With the Cholesky decomposition shocks in equations are uniquely related to shocks in variables.
In an SVAR system, because there are no unique left-hand-side variables, there is no unique correspondence between between shocks in variables and shocks to equations. Thus, shocks to a given equation can be positive or negative as a result. One could normalize the shocks to be a particular sign, but this is merely selecting among the modes of the posterior of the coefficients in A 0 . This "sign normalization" complicates the sampling of the model, but leaves the interpretation of the orthogonal shocks in the SVAR unchanged for the respective impulse responses. 
Modeling Macro-Political Dynamics
This B-SVAR model is quite general and it subsumes a number of well known models as special cases: autoregressive distributed lag models, error correction models, ARIMA models, reduced form and simultaneous equation models, etc. (for details, see Brandt and Williams 2007) . This generality allows us to address the four main problems of macro modeling outlined earlier.
Complexity and Model Scale
Modeling politics as a system requires an analyst to specify a set of state variables and the causal connections between them. 18 The problem is that as more variables are needed to describe a system, the usefulness of the model diminishes. The model proposed in equation (1) This is a large number of parameters -even for small choices of m and p (if m = 6 and p = 6, this would equate to at least 237 parameters). The flexibility of the model comes at a cost: higher degrees of parameter uncertainty relative to the available degrees of freedom.
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The results of this cost are that inferences tend to be rather imprecise. So efforts to assess the impact of political and economic variables on each other may produce null findings because of a lack of degrees of freedom relative to the number of parameters. These problems arise because large, unrestricted models tend to overfit data. For example, they attribute too much impact to the parameters on distant lags. 20 One solution is to restrict the number of endogenous variables in the model and to restrict the dynamics by limiting the number of lagged values in the model. As noted in the Introduction, political scientists who study macro political dynamics are comfortable with the concept of a (sub)system whether in terms of the macropolity (Erikson, MacKuen and 18 A system is a "particular segment of historically observable reality [that] is mutually interdependent and externally, to some extent, autonomous" (Cortes, Przeworski and Sprague 1974, 6) . And the state of a dynamic system, as embodied in a collection of state variables, is "the smallest set of numbers which must be specified at some [initial time] to predict uniquely the behavior of the system in the future" (Ogata 1967, 4) .
19 A contrast to this is item-response theory (IRT) models which are used to model ideological scales. There the number of parameters is large and helps in fitting the model of multiple responses. 20 Sampling error is one of the reasons too much emphasis is put on the data at distant lags. On the problems associated with increases in model scale relative to the dynamic analysis and forecasting see Zha (1998) , Sims and Zha (1998, 958-960) and Robertson and Tallman (1999, esp ., p. 6 and fn. 7).
Stimson 2002) or international conflict (Goldstein et al. 2001) . But these restrictions are problematic because they are often ad hoc and can lead to serious inferential problems (Sims 1980) . Using the Sims-Zha prior in a structural VAR model has two distinct advantages. First, it allows us to work with larger systems with a set of informed or baseline inexact restrictions on the parameters. Second, it reduces the high degree of inferential uncertainty produced by the large number of parameters. For instance, the Sims-Zha prior produces smaller and smaller variances of the higher order lags (via λ 3 ).
Endogeneity and Identification
Political scientists are aware of the problem of simultaneity bias. They also are sensitive to the fact that their instruments may not be adequate to eliminate this bias (Bartels 1991) . But when it comes to medium and large scale systems, most political scientists are content to make strong assumptions about the exogeneity of a collection of "independent variables" and to impose exact The deeper problem here is that of identification or structure. In the case of macro-political analysis this problem is especially severe because we usually work in non-experimental settings.
Manipulation of variables and experimental controls are not possible. Manski (1995, 3) emphasizes the seriousness of this problem: ". . . the study of identification comes first. Negative identification findings imply that statistical inference is fruitless. . . ." Manski acknowledges endogeneity as one of three effects that make identification difficult.
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Structure in a B-SVAR model amounts to the contemporaneous relationships between the variables that one expects to see. Those that are not plausible are restricted to zero (so zeros are placed in appropriate elements of the contemporaneous coefficient matrix A 0 ) and the remaining contemporaneous relationships are estimated. The real advantages of this modeling approach are 1) it 21 Erikson et al. do perform a handful of exogeneity tests. See for instance, the construction of their presidential approval model. But when it comes to analyzing their whole system, they simply posit a recursion for their "historical structural simulation." We elaborate on this point in our first illustration. 22 The other two effects that confound identification are contextual effects and correlation effects.
forces analysts to confront and justify which relationships are present contemporaneously and 2) it imposes restrictions on the paths of the relationships over time. This is particularly relevant in political economy applications. Consider for instance a model of monetary policy and presidential approval. Here, economic variables affect monetary policy making and vice versa. Hence the structural specification has to include economic as well as political relationships. Just as critical is specifying the timing of the impacts of relationships among approval, monetary policy, and the economy (for an example of this, see Williams (1990) ). Some of the variables are likely to be contemporaneously related-e.g., approval and monetary policy.
To specify the contemporaneous structure of the B-SVAR model, the equations in the system often are partitioned into groups called "sectors. 
Persistence and Dynamics
Political series exhibit complex dynamics. In some cases they are highly autoregressive and equilibrate to a unique, constant level. In other cases, the series tend to remember politically relevant 23 The idea that theories imply restrictions on contemporaneous relationships may seem new. But Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996, 9ff .) point out such restrictions are implicit in our decisions to make variables predetermined and exogenous. In terms of the actual estimation, an unrestricted element in A 0 means the data potentially can pull the posterior mode for the respective parameter off its prior (zero) value. In contrast, a zero restriction on A 0 forces the respective posterior mode to be zero.
shocks for very long periods of time thus exhibiting nonstationarity (i.e., a stochastic trend). In still other cases these stochastic political trends tend to move together and are thus cointegrated. Political scientists have found evidence of stochastic trends in approval and uncovered evidence that political series are (near) cointegrated (e.g., Ostrom and Smith 1993 , Clarke and Stewart 1995 , BoxSteffensmeier and Smith 1996 , DeBoef and Granato 1997 , Clarke, Ho and Stewart 2000 . Erikson et al. (1998 Erikson et al. ( , 2002 , Chapter 4) make a sophisticated argument about the interpretation of macropartisanship as a nonstationary "running tally of events." Such arguments reveal beliefs about whether a series will re-equilibrate. How quickly this occurs and the implications for inference are matters of debate.
Our point is that these beliefs are best expressed as probabilistic statements rather than based on knife-edged tests for cointegration or unit roots. One of the benefits of using a Bayesian structural time series model is that it allows us to investigate beliefs about the dynamic structure of the data.
If the researcher has a strong belief about the stationarity / non-stationarity of the variables one can combine this belief with the data and see if it generates a high or low probability posterior value (rather than a knife-edged result).
The Sims-Zha prior accounts for these dynamic properties of the data in three ways. The first is by allowing the prior beliefs about standard deviation around the first lag coefficients λ 1 to be small implying strong beliefs that the variables in the system follow random walks and are non-stationary. 24 The prior allows analysts to incorporate beliefs about stochastic trends and cointegration. Continuing with the enumeration in Table 1 , the Sims-Zha prior also includes two additional hyperparameters that scale a set of dummy observations or pre-sample information that correspond to the following beliefs: 
Model Uncertainty
The problem of model uncertainty is an outgrowth of the weakness of macro-political theory.
This uncertainty operates at two levels: theoretical uncertainty and statistical uncertainty. Theoretical uncertainty includes the specification of the variables in the model and their endogenous relationships. Statistical uncertainty encompasses the uncertainty about the estimated parameters.
The uncertainty of these estimates depends on the prior beliefs, the data, and the structure of the model-which itself may be due to indeterminate theoretical structure.
Observational equivalence (viz., poor identification) is a consequence of both forms of uncertainty, which are often hard to separate. Too often multiple models explain the data equally well.
As the scale of our models increases this problem becomes more and more severe: models with many variables and multiple equations will all fit the data well (Leeper, Sims and Zha, 1996, 14-15; Sims and Zha 1998, 958-960) . Models that are highly parameterized and based on uncertain specifications complicate dynamic predictions. The degree of uncertainty about the dynamic (impulse) responses of medium and large scale systems inherits the serial correlation that is part of the endogenous systems of equations. Hence conventional methods for constructing error bands 25 Tallman (1999, 2001 ) compare the forecasting performance of a wide number of VAR and Bayesian VAR specifications. They find that it is the provision for unit roots and common trends that is most responsible for the improvement in the forecasting performance of their model over unrestricted VARs and VARs with exact restrictions.
26 From the Bayesian perspective nonstationarity is not a nuisance. Williams (1993) and Freeman, Williams, Houser and Kellstedt (1998) document the problems nonstationarity causes for political inference. The crux of the problem is whether the true values of parameters are in a neighborhood that implies nonstationarity. If they are, in finite samples, normal approximations may be inaccurate as the boundary of the region for stationary parameters is approached. Empirical macroeconomists are reluctant, as we should be, to assume that parameters are distant from this boundary (see Sims and Zha 1995, 2) . This problem seems to be overlooked by our leading Bayesians Gill (2004, 328) and Jackman (2004, 486). around them are inadequate (Sims and Zha 1999) .
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How then do we select from among competing theoretical and statistical specifications? We first need to be able to evaluate distinct model specifications or parametric restrictions (e.g, specifications based on different theoretical models, restrictions on lag length, equations, and A 0 identification choices). Second, there are a large variety of possible prior beliefs for BVAR and B-SVAR models Evaluations of model specifications are hypothesis tests and are typically evaluated using some comparison of a model's posterior probability-such as Bayes factors where one compares the prior odds of two (or more) models to the posterior odds of the models. This is appropriate for comparing functional and parametric specifications. Methods that are particularly relevant for One common suggestion by non-Bayesians is to "estimate" the prior hyperparameters. That is, one should treat the hyperparameters as a set of additional nuisance parameters (e.g., fixed effects) that can be estimated as part of the maximization of the likelihood (posterior) of the model. This 27 A notable exception here are the item-response models used to create ideological scales for members of Congress and Supreme Court justices (Martin and Quinn 2002 , Poole 1998 , Poole and Rosenthal 1997 . Here adding more parameters actually helps reduce the uncertainty about the underlying ideological indices. is problematic, as Carlin and Louis (2000, 31-32) note: "Strictly speaking, empirical estimation of the prior is a violation of Bayesian philosophy: the subsequent prior-to-posterior updating . . . would 'use the data twice' (first in the prior, and again in the likelihood). The resulting inferences would thus be 'overconfident'."
Further complicating the assessment of prior specification is the nature of time series data itself.
Time series data are not a "repeated" sample. This is what causes many of the major inferential problems in classical time series analysis, especially unit root analysis. Williams (1993, 231) argues that "Classical inference is . . . based on inferring something about a population from a sample of data. In time-series, the sample is not random, and the population contains the future as well as past." The presence of unit roots and the special nature of a time series sample thus argue against "testing" for the prior. Instead, priors should reflect our beliefs based on past analyses, history, and expectations about the future. They should not then be estimated from the data, as this is only one realization of the data generation process.
To compare prior or structural specifications in a B-SVAR model, we use one of several posterior probabilities. One useful measure is the the log marginal data density (known also as the log marginal likelihood) for the B-SVAR model:
where logP r(Y |A 0 , A + ) is the log likelihood for the B-SVAR model, logP r(A 0 , A + ) is the log prior probability of the parameters, and logP r(A 0 , A + |Y ) is the posterior probability of the B-SVAR model parameters. Since a Gibbs sampler is used to sample the B-SVAR model, we can compute log marginal data density (log(m(Y ))) in Equation (8) using the method proposed by Chib (1995) . 28 These log probabilities of the data summarize the probability of the model and can 28 This quantity is estimated via
where m is the number of equations, N is the length of the Gibbs sampler chain and A 0 (i) k is the i'th column of A 0 be computed from the Gibbs sampler output used from the model (Geweke 2005 , Chapter 8).
Alternatively, one can exploit the conditional densities of the model parameters and compute probabilities for other sets of model coefficients. This is a useful model check since it allows one to compare the probabilities of various parameters and their posterior odds. Most useful will be probability summaries of P r(A 0 , A + |Y ) which are produced in the calculation of the log marginal data density in Equation 8.
A B-SVAR Model of the American Political Economy
Modeling the connections between the economy and political opinion has been a major goal in 
The Macro-Political Economy in Terms of a Bayesian-SVAR Model
We construct a nine equation system that incorporates the major features of research about the macroeconomy and polity. We take as our starting point two parallel bodies of work: 1) the macropolity model of EMS and 2) the empirical macroeconomic models in Sims and Zha (1998) at draw k. Note that we do this computation one column at a time for A 0 per the blocking scheme for computing the log marginal density using the Gibbs sampler (Chib 1995 (Chib , 1315 . 29 Chapter 10 of The Macropolity is a very serious modeling effort. The first part stresses (verbally) and presents schematically political-economic feedback and endogeneity. But the actual modeling-"historical simulation"-is mainly computational. To avoid the "nightmare of endogeneity" EMS use lags and impose a recursive structure on their system and then place coefficient values from their single equation estimations into their equations one-by-one. EMS do not attempt to estimate their whole system of equations simultaneously and, as they themselves note, they do not provide any measures of precision for their impulse responses. There is a report of an exogeneity test (123, fn. 8). But most of the identifying restrictions for EMS's model are posited, not established through any analyses of the data. and Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) 31 See the concluding chapter of The Macropolity especially pages 444-448. EMS quote Alesina and Rosenthal's (1995, 224) argument that "the interconnections between politics and economics is sufficiently strong that the study of capitalist economies cannot be solely the study of market forces." EMS admit however that in most of their book they treat the economy as exogenous to the polity. 32 Data on most economic variables and consumer sentiment were obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data Base at the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. All values are seasonally adjusted where applicable. The price index for raw commodities is from Commodity Research Bureau http://www.crbtrader.com/crbindex/. The monthly real GDP series was generated using the Denton method to distribute the quarterly real GDP totals over the intervening months using monthly measures of industrial production, civilian employment, real retail sales, personal consumption expenditures and the Institute of Supply Managers' index of manufacturing production as instruments (Leeper, Sims and Zha 1996) . of the consumer sentiment and presidential approval variables in Green, Palmquist and Schickler (1998) . The final exogenous variable is an election counter which runs from 1 to 48 over a four year presidential term to capture election cycle effects, as suggested by Williams (1990) . The reason for these transformations is that our subsequent dynamic responses for the logged variables will all be interpretable in percentage terms for each variable.
34 Note that our sample differs from that used in EMS in two ways. First, we cover a more recent time span than that used in the their analyses since we include data from 1978-2004. Second, we are working with monthly data, which means our analysis will contain more sampling variability than the aggregated quarterly data used by EMS. We use monthly data because their arguments imply different reaction times for approval and macropartisanship to changes in the economy and consumer sentiment. 35 The second dummy, for party control, may be weakly endogenous. Future research on the model will try to test for this possibility.
neous structural relationships to be estimated while the empty cells are constrained to be zero.
We must provide a rationale for the contemporaneous restrictions and relationships. Beginning with the economic sectors, the restrictions for the Information, Monetary Policy, Money Demand and Production sectors come from the aforementioned studies in macroeconomics. This specification of the structure of the economy has been found to be particularly useful in the study of economic policy (see e.g., Sims 1986b , Williams 1990 , Robertson and Tallman 2001 , Waggoner and Zha 2003a . 36 Next we ask, "which economic equations are affected contemporaneously by shocks to the political variables?" This is a question about the restrictions to the political shocks in the economic equations (those in the three right-most columns and first six rows of Table 2 ).
To allow for political accountability, contemporaneous effects are specified for political variables in two of the economic equations. First, the macropolity variables-approval, consumer sentiment, and macropartisanship can have a contemporaneous effect on commodity prices. 37 This is consistent with recent results in international political economy such as Bernhard and Leblang (2006) . Second, presidential approval is expected to have a contemporaneous effect on interest rates and on the reaction of the Federal Reserve (Beck 1987 , Williams 1990 , Morris 2000 . The argument for estimating these structural parameters is that there can be a within-month reaction by the Federal Reserve to changes in the standing of the presidents who manage their approval.
Finally, we ask "how do economic shocks contemporaneously affect the political variables?" This is a question about the structure of the last three rows of Table 2 . We argue that the real economic variables-represented by GDP, unemployment, and inflation variables-contemporaneously affect the macropolity. The contemporaneous specification of A 0 for the macropolity variables (the last three rows of Table 2 ) allows all of the production sector variables to contemporaneously affect the macropolity variables: innovations in GDP, unemployment, and prices have an immediate effect on consumer sentiment, approval, and macropartisanship. These contemporaneous 36 The distinction between contemporaneous and lagged effects is conceived in terms of the speed of response. For example, consider shocks in interest rates. Commodity prices respond immediately to these shocks, while it takes at least a month for firms to adjust their spending to the rise in interest rates. Hence there is a zero restriction for the impact of R on Y. Again, there is a lagged effect of R on Y and this is captured by A + . 37 We thank an earlier reviewer for suggesting the endogenous relationship between macropartisanship and the information sector. relationships are suggested by the control variables used in EMS and by related studies of the economic determinants of public opinion (inter alia, Clarke and Stewart 1995 , Clarke, Ho and Stewart 2000 , Green, Palmquist and Schickler 1998 . We also specify a recursive contemporaneous relationship among the consumer sentiment, approval, and macropartisanship variables. This is suggested by the discussion of purging in EMS (1998). The blank cells in Table 2 denote the absence of any contemporaneous impact of the column variables on the row variables. Finally, note that Σ has (9 × 10)/2 = 45 free parameters and the A 0 matrix in Table 2 has 38 free parameters.
Hence, it A 0 is over-identified.
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[ The second step in specifying the B-SVAR model is to represent the beliefs about the model's parameters. These beliefs are specified by the hyperparameters. EMS and SZ reveal similar beliefs about the character of the macro-political economy. SZ propose a benchmark prior for empirical macroeconomics with values of λ 1 = 0.1, λ 3 = 1, λ 4 = 0.1, λ 5 = 0.07, and µ 5 = µ 6 = 5. These values imply a model with relatively strong prior beliefs about unit roots, some cointegration, but with little drift in the variables. This prior corresponds to a political economy with strong stochastic trends and that is difference stationary. This is very similar to EMS's "running tally" model which also has stochastic trends but limited drift in the variables. EMS also reveal a belief that some variables in their political-economic system are cointegrated. Illustrative is EMS's argument that macropartisanship is integrated order 1. This reveals a belief the coefficients for the first own lags of some variables should be unity or that λ 1 is small. EMS also express confidence that approval and consumer sentiment do not have unit roots, which is still possible with these beliefs. We denote this prior by the name "EMS-SZ Tight".
Because these hyperparameters are not directly elicited from EMS, it is wise to consider alternative representations of beliefs. A sensitivity analysis is recommended in an investigation like this, as noted above (Gill 2004 , Jackman 2004 . We therefore propose two additional prior spec-ifications. The second, allows for more uncertainty than the EMS and SZ prior (larger standard deviations for the parameters and less weight on the sum of autoregressive coefficients and impact of the initial conditions). We denote this second prior, "EMS-SZ Loose". The third prior is a diffuse prior (but still proper so that we can compute posterior densities for various quantities of interest). The hyperparameters for this final prior represents uninformative or diffuse beliefs about stochastic trends, stochastic drifts, and cointegration. The hyperparameters for this diffuse prior allow for large variances around the posterior coefficients, relative to hyperparameters in the EMS-SZ priors. Thus we analyze the fit of a B-SVAR model with two informed priors and one uninformed prior. The priors are summarized in the Table 3. [ Table 3 about here.] Table 3 presents the log marginal data densities for the three priors. After selecting a model based on this criteria, we then turn to the dynamic inferences. The interpretation of the B-SVAR model is dependent on the contemporaneous structure and the prior, but in a way made explicit by the Bayesian approach. We thus are able to show systematically how our results depend on the beliefs we bring to the B-SVAR modeling exercise. 39 As suggested earlier, the log marginal data density (log(m(Y ))) is used to compare the prior specifications.
Results
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The final rows of Table 3 report the log marginal data density estimates. The diffuse prior model has the highest value. But this is not a suitable prior. First, inspection of the results from this model shows that it overfits the sample data, allowing many non-zero higher order lag coefficients.
This means that impulse responses from this model have implausibly large confidence regions 39 The additional sensitivity and robustness analysis will be made available with the replication materials for this article. These auxiliary results support the claims made here. 40 All posterior fit results are for a posterior sample of 40000 draws with a burnin of 4000 draws using two independent chains. The parameters in the two chains pass all standard diagnostic tests-traceplots show good mixing, Geweke diagnostics are insignificant, and Gelman-Rubin psrfs are 1. Thus, we are confident that the sampler has converged. The numerical standard error is computing using a Newey-West correction to account for the serial correlation in the Gibbs sampler output as suggested by Geweke (2005, 149, 256) and Chib (1995 Chib ( , 1316 . This standard error summarizes the numerical accuracy of the simulation of the log marginal data density estimate at the posterior mode, not the variation in the log marginal data density itself.
making any dynamic inferences difficult. Second, the log posterior probability of the diffuse prior's parameters in the last row of Table 3 is very low meaning that the estimates of the parameters for this model are very unlikely to have generated the data. Third, the computation of log(m(Y )) in Equation 8 weights the posterior probability of the data by this probability of the parameters. Since the parameters have low probability and the in-sample fit is too good, this computation will lead to an inflated estimate. 41 The EMS-SZ Loose prior is better than the EMS-SZ Tight prior based on the log(m(Y )) values of the log marginal data density. The former generates a posterior with a larger log(m(Y )) than the EMS-SZ Tight prior. The log Bayes factor which compares the two prior specifications is 836, indicating a strong preference for the Loose prior over the Tight prior.
For each of the three priors in Table 3 we computed the impulse responses for the full nine The results for the two informed priors differ in a reasonable way. The responses to shocks in with the EMS-SZ Tight prior are more permanent and dissipate more slowly than those in the EMS-SZ Loose prior, as expected. The latter allows for more variance in the parameters and more rapid lag decay (and thus faster equilibration to shocks than with the EMS-SZ Tight prior).
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We focus on two sets of impulse responses for the model with the EMS-SZ Loose prior. The first are the responses of the economy to changes in politics. Figure 1 presents the subset of the 41 As Chib (1995) notes, the quantity in Equation 8 is the log of the basic marginal likelihood identity or
For the diffuse prior model, the posterior probability of the parameters in the denominator, P r(A 0 , A + |Y ) will be small. This will then (incorrectly) inflate the computation of m(Y ) and hence its logarithm. This is evidence in Tableresponses of the economic equations to shocks in the macropolity sector variables. 43 Each row are the responses for the indicated equation for a shock in the column variable. Responses are median estimates with 68% confidence region error bands, computed pointwise over a 48 month time horizon. 44 The interpretation of the impulse responses differs from those typically seen in the literature. In standard reduced form VAR models with a recursive identification of the contemporaneous error covariance, one analyzes the responses to positive shocks to each equation in the system. Such a normalization of the shocks is not possible in non-recursive B-SVAR models (Waggoner and Zha 2003b) . This is because there is no unique correspondence of shocks to equations in a simultaneous system like an SVAR. Thus positive shocks to one equation may imply negative shocks to other equations (e.g., structural shocks to the inflation and unemployment equations should have opposite signs because of their Philips' curve relationship).
[ Figure 1 about here.]
The responses of the economy to shocks in the macropolity variables indicate that changes in public opinion and expectations do have predictable and sizeable effects on the economy. Shocks enter the commodity price (Pcom) equation positively, so that increases in consumer sentiment lead to lagged increases in commodity prices, reaching a maximum of 0.1% over 30 months. Similarly, increases in approval generate less than 0.05% decreases in commodity prices. With respect to the monetary policy and money demand sectors (M2 and R), changes in consumer sentiment and approval affect interest rates, but not monetary policy. These shocks enter the interest rate equation negatively so declines in consumer sentiment increase interest rates (with the lower edge of the 68% confidence region at zero) while declines in approval lead to lower interest rates over 10-12 months. Thus, consumer sentiment (presidential approval) and interest rates are positively 43 These responses were generated using the Gibbs sampler for B-SVAR model in Waggoner and Zha (2003a) . This Gibbs sampler draws samples from the posterior distribution of the restricted (over-identified) A 0 matrix and then from the autoregressive parameters of the model. These draws are then used to construct the impulse responses . The responses have been scaled by a factor of 100, so they are in percentage point terms. We employ a posterior based on 20000 draws after a burnin of 2000 draws. Similar results were obtained for a posterior sample twice as large using two independent MCMC chains. 44 Sims and Zha (1999) argue that 68% error bands (which are approximately one standard deviation bands on each side of the mode) provide a better summary of the central tendency or likelihood of the impulse responses. Further discussion and examples of why this is a preferable confidence region can be found in .
(negatively) related. Note that the consumer sentiment shock generates an interest rate response that is nearly twice as large and in the opposite direction of the approval shock over 48 months.
The interest rate and money responses are consistent with political monetary cycle arguments that presidents attempt to manage their approval by strengthening the economy; the Fed works counter-cyclically to reduce inflation and unemployment both of which also move in the expected directions to approval shocks (Beck 1987 , Williams 1990 ). These responses are consistent with the idea of political accountability where policy responds to public perceptions of the president. The magnitude of the median total effect of the impact of consumer sentiment on approval is large.
Over 48 months, a one standard deviation drop in consumer sentiment lowers approval by a total median impact of -1.6 points; at 48 months the probability that the cumulative response of approval to the consumer sentiment shock is negative is 0.73. Thus, innovations in information markets impact consumer sentiment and approval and then the impacts on consumer sentiment feed-forward into subsequent approval changes. Note however that the real economy does not have impacts on any of the macropolity variables.
Consider next the responses of the macropolity sector. These results differ from those previously seen in the literature (cf., EMS, Chapter 10) because they are the result of embedding the macropolity in a full model of the political economy. Consumer sentiment responds mainly to its own shocks and not those of the other political variables (not even with a lag). The consumer sentiment response to approval shocks is small over 48 months. Neither consumer sentiment nor approval respond to changes in macropartisanship.
One of the main questions for both our analysis and for EMS is the exploration of what moves aggregate partisanship? The final row of plots in Figure 2 shows the responses for the macropartisanship equation. Positive shocks in the production sector and in presidential approval have no sizeable impact on aggregate partisanship. The response of macropartisanship to positive one standard deviation shocks in commodity prices and consumer sentiment are suggestive, but weak. Over 48 months the positive commodity price and consumer sentiment shocks lower macropartisanship by only about 0.05%. The impact of these shocks on macropartisanship does not cumulate to even a one point change over 48 months. In the end, the macropartisanship equation is mainly driven by shocks to macropartisanship itself.
Conclusion
Political scientists need to learn how to specify B-SVAR models. Translating beliefs into the contemporaneous relationships in A 0 appears straightforward. Careful study of the literature on topics like macropartisanship usually reveals how researchers conceive of some of these relationships.
Admittedly, scholars often do not mention some contemporaneous relationships and it is not clear that setting them to zero is reasonable. But the virtue of the structural VAR approach is that it allows us to estimate whether the respective contemporaneous coefficient should be unrestricted.
Using a Bayesian approach also allows us to summarize our uncertainty about such contemporaneous restrictions. In addition, we need to learn how to specify the hyperparameters. Scholars sometimes are not clear about their beliefs about all of these parameters. How much sampling error should be discounted via the choice of λ 0 is another issue. In recent years political methodologists have produced a number of useful findings about the persistence properties of political data.
However, macroeconomists are far ahead of us in this regard. They have much more experience in translating their arguments and experience in fitting B-SVAR models into clusters of hyperpa-rameters. An important part of this experience comes from years of attempting to forecast the macroeconomy. The efforts to forecast the macropolity and international relations, are, for myriad reasons, less well developed in our discipline.
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Important extensions of the B-SVAR model are being developed. For example, there are new methods for translating theory into additional restrictions on the effects of lagged endogenous variables (the A + matrix in the model) and for formally testing these restrictions (e.g., Cushman
and Zha 1997). Some researchers contend that formal models produce more useful structural insights than VAR models (structural, reduced form and/or Bayesian). Proponents of Bayesian time series models reply that formal models often suffer from problems of observational equivalence and that they are very difficult to fit to data. A more catholic approach is taken by Sims (2005) who argues that formal models-in the case of macroeconomics, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models-are good for "spinning stories" and that these stories ought to be restrained or refined by the results of VARs. Work is underway in macroeconomics to try to make this connection more explicit. This work specifically uses DSGE models to develop informed priors for B-SVAR models. The DSGE models are linearized at the point representing general, macroeconomic equilibrium and then the parameter values from the DSGE model are translated into the hyperparameters of the B-SVAR model.
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In political science we lack a well developed, general equilibrium theory of the kind that spawned DSGE models. However, spatial theory and the new works on electoral coordination and campaign finance (Mebane 2000 , Mebane 2003 , Mebane 2005 point the way to the development of such theory. The challenge is to join these works with the B-SVAR approach to make more sustained progress in study of the macropolity.
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46 Perhaps this is why most Bayesians in political science employ uninformed priors. On this point see . 47 Ingram and Whiteman (1994) and Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) draw informed priors from DSGEs for BVARs. Leeper et al. (1996) argue that DSGE models provide insights into the long-term economic dynamics and VARs into the short-term dynamics of the economy. In a more recent article, Sims (2005) notes that DSGE models are better than VARs for "spinning elaborate stories about how the economy works" but expresses some skepticism about whether linearizations of DSGE models usually produce accurate second order approximations to the likelihood. He goes on to say, "No one is thinking about the time varying residual variances when they specify or calibrate these [DSGE] models." Sims predicts a "hornet's nest" for macroeconomic DSGE policy modelers. 48 For a sketch of how this development might occur see Freeman (2005 Variables Pcom M2 R Y CPI U CS A MP Information Pcom X X X X X X X X X Monetary Policy M2 X X X Money Demand R X X X X X Production Y X Production CPI X X Production U X X X Macropolity CS X X X X Macropolity A X X X X X Macropolity MP X X X X X X 
